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Abstract: 
Development economics have over the years produced several one-factor 
explanations by one-sidedly focusing on specific development factors or mechanisms 
as for example saving and investment, human capital, free markets, technology, 
institutions and production structure. In this paper we term such narrow monocausal 
explanations as ‘fundamentalisms’. We identify and discuss several types of 
fundamentalism. We then argue that these diverse explanations of development in 
reality are interdependent and complement each other, and hence that the process of 
economic development must be understood as systemic.  
 
Throughout the paper there is a focus on natural resource-based development. It has 
been argued that abundant natural resources are detrimental to economic development 
– an argument known as the resource curse, which is one type of ‘production structure 
fundamentalism’. We argue that abundant natural resources can be a curse as well as a 
blessing. But if you can build an institutional framework for the utilization of specific 
natural resources, which supports development of new knowledge and competences 
that can be applied in a range of different activities, resource based development is 
possible. The latter is illustrated by examples from Norway, the US and especially 
Brazil. We conclude that it is not the various endowments per se that are 
‘fundamental’ for development, but rather the by institutions sustained 
interdependency and interaction between the different types of development factors, 
and how these are managed or coordinated.  
 
Keywords: 
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1 Introduction 
Maybe as a result of exaggerated enshrining the KISS (keep it simple, stupid) 
principle development economics have over the years produced several one-factor 
explanations by one-sidedly focusing on specific development factors or mechanisms 
(Adelman 2001). At the same time there exists a deep mistrust among many scholars 
towards such mono-causal explanations, especially among economic historians: 
“Economic analysis cherishes the illusion that one good reason should be enough, 
but the determinants of complex processes are invariably plural and interrelated. 
Monocausal explanations will not work” (Landes 1998, p 517). In spite of such 
insights a strong focus on one single factor, which is believed to be the basic 
development factor or root cause of development to some degree continues to 
characterize development thinking and development policy. Recent examples of 
‘monocausalism’ have centred around macroeconomic balance and free markets, 
knowledge, institutions, natural resources and the structure of economic activities. 
Accordingly we can identify elements of at least ‘market fundamentalism’, 
‘institutions fundamentalism’, ‘knowledge fundamentalism’ and ‘structure 
fundamentalism’ in development thinking, where the notion of fundamentalism is 
taken to mean an exaggerated reliance on a rather narrow set of factors as the main 
cause of development. The tendency to seek mono-causal explanations, while often 
casting light on both the benefits and limitations of specific development factors, 
underestimates the complexity and context dependency of economic development and 
stands in the way for the formulation of usable development strategies and policies.  
 
After shortly presenting some common forms of fundamentalisms we will take a 
closer look at structure fundamentalism. One type of structure fundamentalism is 
exemplified by the resource-curse argument. Here manufacturing activities are seen as 
the fundamental driving force in development which dismisses a proactive role for 
what we call natural resource-based industries. Consequently, an economic structure 
without natural resource-based industries is a ‘good’ structure. The point of this 
exercise is that we by critically scrutinising the foundations of this form of structure 
fundamentalism illustrate the weaknesses of monocausalism. We argue that the 
various monocausal explanations should be integrated in a framework capable of 
grasping a fuller picture of development, and that natural resource-based development 
can be a viable development strategy. On this basis we suggest an innovation system 
framework as a workable approach for grasping the complexities of economic 
development. 
 
Additionally, the topic of natural resources and development is relevant and 
interesting in its own right. According to Ross (1999) twenty-seven of the thirty-six 
countries in the World Bank’s most troubled category – severely indebted low-income 
countries – are primary commodity exporters. A better understanding of the role of 
natural resources in development could have far reaching consequences for such 
countries. Moreover, the issue of natural resources and development is currently an 
extremely interesting topic because the world is witnessing a ‘new scramble for 
natural resources’ (see e.g. Knaup and Mittelstaedt 2009). Developed countries have 
realised that knowledge is not sufficient to thrive in the knowledge economy – natural 
resources may be a necessary foundation for production, energy and consumption –
especially the link between land, biomass and energy is growing in importance.   
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In next section we discuss the forms of fundamentalism mentioned above. In section 
three we consider the role of natural resources in structural change on the basis of 
structure fundamentalism. Here we use empirical examples in our argumentation – 
notably sugarcane and biofuel production in Brazil. In section four we present an 
alternative conceptual formulation of the role of economic structure in development. 
In section five we summarise the differences between these conceptual models by 
outlining a distinction between an endowment approach and a process approach to 
economics. The paper is concluded by a short discussion of how one can analytically 
approach the study of economic development and overcome fundamentalist 
tendencies. 
2 Widespread types of fundamentalism 
2.1 Market fundamentalism 
During the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1980s and 1990s it was widely believed 
that policies for macroeconomic balance (which, oddly enough, did not include full 
employment) should be at the core of an effective strategy for development. 
Balancing state budgets, using restrictive monetary and fiscal policies to curb 
inflation and adjusting exchange rates to reduce current account deficits were referred 
to as ‘getting policies right’. This was combined with institutional recommendations, 
which were supposed to strengthen the market mechanisms; financial liberation, trade 
liberalization, openness to foreign direct investment, deregulation, privatization and 
secure (private) property rights. This policy stance - stabilize, privatize, liberalize and 
let markets do their job - has been referred to as ‘market fundamentalism’ (Rodrik 
2006).  
 
The confidence in the Washington Consensus was eroded during the 1990s and there 
is now wide-spread agreement (also in the World Bank, see World Bank 2005) that it 
didn’t work. The transition in Eastern Europe was accompanied by long and deep 
decline in spite of efforts to privatize and liberalize. Sub-Saharan countries failed to 
take off in spite of policies inspired by the Washington Consensus. Furthermore, there 
were frequent financial crisis in Latin America, East Asia, Russia and Turkey, there 
were disappointing growth rates in Latin America and there was a big crisis in 
Argentina in 2002, while developing countries that didn’t follow the Washington 
Consensus (especially China and India) did very well (Rodrik 2006). 
2.2 Institutions fundamentalism. 
As a result of its failure the Washington Consensus became less narrow with less 
attention to macroeconomic balance and free markets and more attention to a 
somewhat broader set of institutions. Market fundamentalism developed into a kind of 
‘institutions fundamentalism’. The new slogan “get the institutions right” was 
substituted for the earlier ones “get the policies right” or “get the prices right” (Rodrik 
2006). ‘Good governance’ became the new star among one-factor explanations of 
development. This now very common notion typically includes things like ‘the rule of 
law’, ‘political accountability’, ‘transparency in policy-making’ and ‘quality of 
bureaucracy’ (Kaufman and Kray, 2007). 
A rather clear empirical correlation between good governance and the level of 
national income has been demonstrated over broad groups of countries and this is one 
reason that it has become an important target among development aid donors and in 
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the World Bank. It should be noted, however, that ‘good governance’ is hard to define 
and measure in a precise way, which makes it difficult to apply in policy 
recommendations. It is, for example, not easy to define the rule of law unambiguously 
since there are different legal traditions in different countries. The meaning of 
political accountability, transparency and quality of bureaucracy also vary much from 
country to country because of different traditions and different complimentary 
institutions.  
 
The mentioned type of institutions fundamentalism, which concentrates on good 
governance, can be placed within the transaction costs school. The policy approach is 
to support the kind of institutional changes, which are thought to reduce transaction 
costs. Such institutional fundamentalism fits better with static efficiency than with 
long run growth and development. It is close to what Coriat and Dosi (1998) calls 
weak (in contrast to strong) institutionalism and what Hodgson (1998) refers to as 
new (in contrast to old) institutionalism. There are, however, also examples of 
institutions fundamentalism, with a more dynamic outlook. For example, Douglass 
North (1990) focuses on how institutions shape incentives for change. ‘Efficient 
property rights’ form incentives, which induce people to make growth-inducing 
decisions. Under efficient property rights it pays-off for people to save and invest in 
production, education, research and so on. In contrast inefficient property rights lead 
to rent-seeking1
 
 behavior or even to directly harmful activities like piracy, violent 
crime and warfare. 
The problem with institutions fundamentalism is that it tends to disregard other 
development factors, especially the interactions between technological and 
institutional change, and that it focuses on a too narrow set of institutions, i.e. 
primarily those related to transaction costs. Furthermore, it tends to underestimate the 
importance of context dependency for the effects of institutions. Every specific 
institutions works differently in different contexts, which makes it difficult to predict 
the economic outcome of simple institutional recommendations like ‘reduce 
corruption’ or ‘strengthen property rights’. 
 
2.3 Knowledge fundamentalism 
Knowledge fundamentalism means that knowledge is taken as the root cause of 
development. It asserts that knowledge transfer from the North to the South and 
improved exploitation of knowledge constitutes a tremendous but underutilized 
opportunity in development. The roots of knowledge fundamentalism stick deep in 
economic theory. Marx (1859) made the development of the ‘forces of production’ 
(an expression for technology or knowledge) to the main source of social and 
economic change and Marshall (1890) stated that ‘…knowledge is the most powerful 
engine of production; it enables us to subdue nature and satisfy our wants’. 
 
But knowledge fundamentalism in development theory and policy is more recent. It 
can be traced back to the exaggerated expectations about the development power of 
human capital that were common in the 1960s and 1970s, when the previous                                                         
1 ‘Rent-seeking is defined as the pursuit of uncompensated value from other economic agents, in contrast 
with profit-seeking, where entities seek to create value through mutually beneficial economic activity’ (IMF 
2005, p126) 
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concentration on investment in physical capital gave way to investment in human 
capital. It was also stimulated by the developmental success of some East Asian 
countries, which prioritized the accumulation of human capital before embarking on 
intense industrialization. Early contributions to new growth theory also implies that 
investments in knowledge and human capital are able to lift developing countries 
from a low-growth path to a high-growth path utilizing economies of scale (Adelman 
2001).  
 
More recently also the World Bank has emphasized the role of knowledge and 
knowledge diffusion in development. “Knowledge is like light. Weightless and 
intangible, it can easily travel the world, enlightening the lives of people everywhere. 
… This World Development Report proposes that we look at the problems of 
development in a new way – from the perspective of knowledge’ (World Development 
Report 1998/99, p.1). The oversimplification that characterize one-factor explanations 
is accentuated in this quotation, which seem to follow the standard assumption in 
main stream economics that it is legitimate to reduce knowledge to information, 
which floats more or less freely between countries. However, as a whole this 
simplistic view doesn’t characterize the World Bank report, which recognize both the 
complexity of knowledge and the costs of knowledge transfer.  
 
It should also be acknowledged that the scholars who have emphasized knowledge as 
fundamental in economic development as a rule also have realized that it doesn’t 
stand alone. Marx, for example, not only underlined the development of the ‘forces of 
production’ but also put it into a dialectical interaction with the ‘relations of 
production’, which primarily refers to the relations defining and enforcing the 
property rights to capital. 
 
2.4 Structure Fundamentalism 
The conviction that the most important factor for economic development for a country 
is its industrial structure may be called ‘structure fundamentalism’. The argument that 
the economic structure (i.e. the specialization pattern) is the fundamental factor 
explaining economic development (structure fundamentalism) has two main pillars. 
(i) Most now-industrialized countries have gone through a similar process of 
structural change during their development process. Applying the tripartite 
classification of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors, the composition of GDP has 
moved away from primary production (agriculture) towards, first, secondary 
production (manufacture) and then tertiary production (services) (Kuznets, 1971). 
This pattern of structural change has the status of a stylized fact. It seems to indicates 
that changing the economic structure of a nation according the pattern mentioned is a 
necessary part of economic development.  
 
(ii) The direction of structural change (away from primary production towards 
industry and services) indicates that some economic activities are better than others 
for generating wealth. This implies that changing one’s economic structure towards 
such activities is a fundamental aspect of development. It might even be seen as the 
underlying, driving force of development. The argument that some economic 
activities are better than others comes in several forms. It is often argued that 
especially manufacturing industry is superior to primary production in terms of 
technological possibilities, income elasticity, linkages and learning and innovation. 
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Regarding recent structural changes it is a standard observation that services, as a 
basic characteristic of the knowledge-based economy, are superior to both primary 
and secondary production in terms of the same parameters (Cohen and Zysman, 
1987).  
 
Along similar lines Reinert (2007) presents a distinction between high and low-
quality economic activities. Economic activities with high productivity growth, high 
potential for further technological improvement, facing increasing demand and 
characterised by imperfect competition and high barriers to entry are high-quality 
economic activities (in this category we find so different examples as golf balls and 
Apple computers). Low quality-economic activities are characterised by close-to 
perfect competition, low productivity growth, limited potential for further 
technological improvement, low income elasticity of demand, barriers to entry based 
on low wage rather than knowledge and little learning (examples are shoes and 
baseballs). Reinert (2007) especially emphasizes the historical importance of the 
manufacturing industry as propelling development via ‘increasing returns to scale’. At 
the same time he dismisses agricultural industry as a base for development primarily 
because it has historically been subject to diminishing returns to scale.  
 
These propositions are in accordance with the recent resource-curse literature (see e.g. 
Sachs and Warner, 1995; Gylfason, 2001). The argument is that natural resources will 
prevent an economy from embarking on a prosperous path of structural change and 
development because they are subject to a ‘pathological disorder’ (Gunton 2003). 
Following this logic development policy should aim at changing the economic 
structure of countries towards a structure dominated by higher shares of 
manufacturing and services, and consequently away from natural resource-based 
industry2
 
. Hence, ‘getting the economic structure right’ is the mantra of this approach 
to development. 
Still, the argument does not fit well with the fact that some countries have moved 
from being natural resource-based economies to being considered advanced, 
knowledge-based economies, as e.g. most Scandinavian countries and the US (cf. next 
section). Moreover, according to Smith (2007), it is a misunderstanding that all 
natural resource-based economies are poor. On the contrary, some of the richest, 
and/or fastest growing, economies today are resource based. According to Smith 
(2007) these economies include Norway, Sweden, Finland, Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia and the Netherlands. This paradox indicates that natural resources are not 
unambiguously ‘bad’, and that structure fundamentalism may be misleading.   
 
We will in the nest section take a closer look at the arguments underlying both 
structure fundamentalism and the resource curse. We will do so on grounds of logic 
and empirical examples of natural resource-based development.  
 
3 Natural resources and Development 
We will take the negative perception of natural resources that structure 
fundamentalism contains as point of departure for this section. The main proposition 
of the latter is that some economic activities (production of certain goods) are                                                         
2 This discourse resembles the low versus high-tech debate (Smith, 2002).  
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qualitatively better than other activities with respect to generating economic 
development. This establishes a hierarchy of economic activities where services and 
especially manufacturing are the main drivers of economic development while 
primary production3
 
 is detrimental to development. We will approach the topic by 
looking at the resource-curse literature. 
This literature argues that natural-resource abundance tends to be associated with 
meagre economic performance on the country level. Evidently a correlation can be 
found between the two parameters, but the suggestions for causality are many – we 
will focus on the two most dominant; the Dutch disease and the absence of linkages. 
We will discuss the core issues in these propositions for causality4
3.1 Measurement of natural resources  
. Below we will 
consider measurement of natural resources, the resource curse, and finally propose an 
alternative more dynamic view on natural resources.  
A word of caution is required regarding the measurement of natural resources used in 
the resource curse literature. Firstly, natural resource-based industry or primary 
production is most often defined as fuels and non-fuel primary products which 
correspond to SITC categories 0, 1, 2, 3 and 68 (Sachs and Warner, 1997), see table 1 
in appendix. Regarding measurement we find it relevant to comment on potential 
caveats: (i) definition of ‘natural-resource abundance’; (ii) fallacy of aggregation; (iii) 
and the periods of time under consideration.  
 
(i) ‘natural-resource abundance’ can inter alia be defined as natural resource-based 
industry in share of GDP, share of value-added, share of employment, share of export 
earnings or share export value-added at one point in time or over a period of time. 
These are the most often-used measurement indicators. Still, the indicators do not say 
anything about physical ‘natural-resource abundance’. They reflect a given country’s 
industrial structure and/or export composition – it illustrates the absence of the 
secondary and tertiary sectors, which is a ‘negative’ definition of natural resources. 
This set-up of data indicates the implicit understanding that the relative absence of 
manufacturing industries is a result of a rich nature. Hence, ‘natural-resource 
abundance’ in the following is to be understood as an industrial structure dominated 
by natural resource-based industry – not as a relatively large physical endowment of 
natural resources.  
 
(ii) There is a general fallacy of aggregation in the resource-curse literature. It has 
been shown that processes of learning and capability building differs across firms, 
industries, place and time (Dosi 1988). It is highly likely that important differences 
exist between natural resource-based industries as for example mining, agriculture 
and fishery, and also within these categories there are differences in terms of crops, 
climate, topography, species and extraction – differences that require specific 
knowledge. This is also noted by Bridge (2008) who points out that it is remarkable 
that in the discussion of natural resources and development the nuances of specific                                                         
3 Primary production will be used interchangeably with natural resource-based industry.  
4 We omitted two aspects of the resource-curse literature, (1) terms-of-trade debate and (2) instability in 
natural-resource markets. We think that we capture the essence of (1) even though we do not focus on it 
explicitly, and also we are not directly concerned with trade effects in this paper. We found that (2) clearly 
is related to issues of economic management and lack of economic diversification – points that we make 
without presenting this literature.  
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and contextual arguments have gone missing. This is inter alia seen by an almost 
exclusive focus on the national level which again ignores other types of foci such as 
sector differences, organisation of firms or capability building.    
 
(iii) It is relevant to pay attention to the periods of time of measurement due to: (a) 
considerations about the pace of structural change and what can be expected in short 
vis-à-vis longer time spans. Statistical evidence for resource curse is often based on 
only a few decades of observation, but structural change may take longer, and will 
most likely not be visible in aggregate statistics (Wright and Czelusta 2002); (b) 
importance of ‘external’ events in a specific period might influence the observed 
phenomenon.  
 
Furthermore, the structure fundamentalism, as understood here, rests upon the 
tripartite classification of the economy. However, there have always been ambiguities 
regarding the demarcation lines between the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. 
For example, when reviewing problems of definition in Australia and New Zealand, 
Fischer (1939) explained that the basic idea was to draw a dividing line on the basis 
of ‘substantial alteration’ in form and character of primary materials. This was to be 
done through manufacturing operations where the end product would be classified as 
a secondary product. Still, as observed by Fisher (1952) ‘it is not easy to determine 
the precise stage in the conversion of milk into butter or cheese when this work ceases 
to be primary and becomes secondary’. The fuzziness of demarcation lines was 
reflected by frequently changing official definitions in New Zealand (1890-1921), cf. 
textbox.  
 
Year Definition of primary production 
General 
speak 
Agricultural and pastoral production 
1891 Agricultural, pastoral, mineral and other primary producers 
1896 All persons mainly engaged in cultivation or acquisition of food products, and in 
obtaining other raw materials from natural sources – and including persons engaged in 
forestry, water conservation and supply, mines and quarries.  
1901 Back to more narrow definition of 1891 
1921 –
broader 
again 
Agricultural and pastoral farming, market gardening, poultry and bee farming, fruit 
growing, fishing and trapping, mining and quarrying, bush saw-milling, scrub cutting 
and gum-digging.  
Table 1: Definition of primary production. 
Fisher (1939) indicated that the changing definitions was partly a result of 
farmers/producers vanity – that they exercised political influence in order to be 
classified as belonging to primary production, because this meant being most 
important - being primary, while secondary had a negative connotation. This 
ambiguity casts doubt on the tripartite classification, and the usefulness of analyses 
based upon it.  
3.2 The Dutch Disease  
Though prominent in the resource curse literature, the Dutch Disease is really neither 
a disease nor Dutch. It is, according to Gylfason (2008), rather a recurring 
phenomenon that involves a reallocation of resources – for example from high-tech, 
skill-intensive service and manufacturing industries to low-tech, low-skill primary 
production – with lasting harmful effects on economic growth and diversification. 
The name remains in use because the Netherlands was the first patient to be 
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diagnosed. The Dutch-disease model describes a situation where an economy 
suddenly receives windfall earnings from an unexpected discovery of natural 
resources – it is named after the Dutch discovery of natural gas in the North Sea in the 
1960s. A gas export boom led to an appreciation of the Dutch Guilder, and 
subsequently total exports from the Netherlands decreased. The causality of the 
argument goes as this: (i) an export boom (of natural resources) leads to appreciation 
of the exchange rate which cet. par. tends to weaken the balance of payment; (ii) the 
export boom will draw capital and labour away from manufacturing sectors into the 
natural resource sector. This reallocation of resources will increase cost of labour and 
materials (because initially the economy was in equilibrium) and thus increase cost 
for all sectors, which will increase the general price level; (iii) because of the latter, 
and the currency appreciation, export of manufacture decreases and the price of non-
tradeables rises; (iv) foreign income from natural-resource export will in turn be used 
to import now cheaper foreign manufactured goods (spending effect). As the natural 
resource-based industry grows it attracts key labour inputs from the rest of the 
economy, which benefits natural resource-based industry and non-tradeables sector.  
Since the starting point is that the natural resource based industry can not lead growth 
and development (decreasing returns to scale), the process will inhibit long-term 
economic development in the country by negatively affecting the manufacturing 
sectors. In general the Dutch Disease has given precedence to a range of so-called 
crowding-out explanations for the resource curse. Scholars state that some factor x is 
positive for economic growth, and that ‘natural-resource abundance’ in some way 
crowds out x. Such arguments have been put forward regarding foreign direct 
investment, social capital, human capital, saving, investment, financial depth and 
inflation (Gylfason 2004). Several objections can be made to the argumentation but 
the most important is that even if we accept that natural resource-based industry is in 
some sense inferior to manufacture, then there are several degrees of freedom for the 
government to take counteracting measures. The Dutch Disease is basically 
describing bad policies. This part of the argument is strongly related to issues of 
institutions rather than to a problem with natural resource-based industry per se. In 
general it can be argued that authors within this part of the resource-curse literature 
are confusing demand effects and supply effects. Demand swings that can lead to 
windfall earnings and tempt governments into unsound policy are different from the 
processes of industrial dynamics that are behind  technological learning and long term 
growth (Wright and Czelusta 2002). 
 
Similarly, Reinert (2007) argues that historically manufacturing has shown increasing 
returns to scale while primary production has shown diminishing returns to scale. 
Reinert’s argument is based on a classical proposition originating from Thomas 
Malthus (1798), who argued that an agricultural sector is subject to diminishing 
returns to scale, and thus can not drive economic development. The argument has two 
aspects. (1) Good land is scarce and when inferior lands are included in production, as 
production increases, the yield per unit of land will gradually diminish (intensive 
agro). (2) Since land is fixed in quantitative terms by nature, it will inevitably be 
subject to diminishing returns to scale (extensive agro), whereas in manufacturing the 
intensive use of capital (machines can produce machines – land can not produce land) 
and increasingly specialized division of labour, can generate productivity 
improvements without ‘natural’ constraints (ecological factors were not yet 
introduced in the argument) and hence generate increasing returns. Thus, in order to 
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promote economic development resources should be allocated to manufacturing. It is 
worth noting that underlying this argument is an idea of natural resources as being 
finite, and thus exhaustible. This is the basis for arriving at the diminishing returns to 
scale conclusion.   
 
An acceptance of Malthus’ argument, and the vast number of examples of ‘backward’ 
and ‘simple’ natural resource-based economies in recent history, have played an 
important role in establishing a consensus in economics, which states that in natural 
resource-based activities there is very limited learning, innovation, technical progress 
and productivity growth, and therefore such activities can’t lead development. The 
point is reflected in the method of argumentation used by Matsuyama (1992) on the 
role of agricultural productivity, where he at the outset assumes learning by doing in 
manufacturing and no learning in agriculture. One could argue that when operating 
with such assumptions, conclusions are given a priori.  
 
A general objection to this perception that could be made is that the obvious omission 
in Malthus’ argument is the role played by technological progress, which has 
continuously increased agricultural productivity. Ferranti, Perry et al. (2002) show 
that productivity growth in agriculture has outpaced that of manufacturing in both 
developed and less developed countries during the 20th century. More precisely, they 
find that in the period 1967 to 1992 total factor productivity growth was significantly 
higher in agriculture than in manufacture; especially in developed countries. On this 
basis the authors conclude that “natural resource-based activities can have high 
productivity growth, technical spillovers, and forward and backward linkages as 
much as modern manufacturing…the view that manufacturing has something special 
must be called into question” (p. 4-7). The latter point indicates that the proponents of 
the negative perception of natural resources tend to confuse historical coincidences 
with universal laws.  
3.3 Linkages and Natural Resources  
An important reason for emphasising the role of manufacturing in development is its 
linkage potential. The argument was put forward by Albert Hirschman (1958) in 
connection with his work on less developed countries. Linkages can be either 
horizontal5 or vertical, and are basically channels of transaction and communication 
between firms and other actors. Vertical linkages can be either backward or forward6
                                                        
5 Horizontal demand linkages are mainly income effects. If industry A invests in new technology that 
decreases price of its products, then consumers will have a relatively higher income, which will increase 
demand for other products. Horizontal/income linkages must per definition affect all industries evenly. 
These are thus not of our interest. 
. 
Hirschman (1958) starts from the complementarity between economic activities and 
investment decisions. He argues that economic structure influences investment 
incentives. It is more ‘interesting’ for industry A to invest, if industry B also invests, 
which is called a linkage effect. Linkages are seen as the basis for inter-industrial 
dynamics, which in turn stimulate structural change and development by enabling 
virtuous circles of investment, production and development. 
6 Vertical linkages focus on inter-industrial demand and related incentives for investment decisions. With 
vertical linkages one industry can create growth in other industries via its demand for intermediate goods 
as inputs to production. Assume industry A is upstream to industry B. An investment decision in industry 
A (technological upgrading) will not necessarily lead to higher profits, unless industry B also makes 
investments or else the demand for industry A’s output will not rise. Industry A is dependent on industry B 
in order to fulfil the potential of its investment.  
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According to Hirschman some industries are better than others for generating linkage 
effects. He places primary production at the bottom of the hierarchy in this respect 
(with subsistence agriculture and/or export-oriented agriculture in mind, it seems). He 
argued (1958: p. 109-110): “the lack of interdependencies and linkages is of course 
one of the most typical characteristics of underdeveloped economies…agriculture in 
general and subsistence agriculture in particular, are of course characterized by the 
scarcity of linkages effects. By definition, all primary production should exclude any 
substantial degree of backward linkage7…the case for inferiority of agriculture to 
manufacturing has most frequently been argued on grounds of comparative 
productivity. While this case has been shown not to be entirely convincing, 
agriculture certainly stands convicted on the count of its lack of direct stimulus to 
setting up new activities through linkage effects: the superiority of manufacture in this 
respect is crushing. This may yet be the most important reason militating against any 
complete specialisation of underdeveloped countries in primary production”. The 
arguments that primary production is inferior to secondary production in terms of 
productivity and linkages are closely connected.8
 
 Hirschman here represents a long 
tradition in economics for understanding the primary sector as inferior to the 
secondary sector.  
The argument is that backward linkages are thought to be few because natural 
resource-based industry does not demand inputs. The input needed is nature, and 
nature is just there to be taken. It is assumed that the natural resources are directly 
available in nature. Also, backward linkages to science and capital goods are thought 
to be weak, because natural resource-based industry is assumed to be straightforward 
to manage. In the primary sector there is not application of sophisticated knowledge 
and no innovation. However, as also pointed out by Hirschman above, this is only true 
for the simplest perception possible of agriculture, as for example picking an apple 
from a tree. Still, today apple production is extensively mechanised and has linkages 
to science. Relevant knowledge bases are inter alia agronomy, precision agriculture, 
vaccines, and biotechnology.  
 
Forward linkages are thought to be few because end products go directly to the 
consumer or are used as input to other industries in the form of raw materials. Raw 
materials per definition do not need processing – they are grown right out of the 
earth’s crust wherefrom they are easily collected. If they were processed they would 
not be primary products. But these are simplifying assumptions rather than facts. Still, 
as pointed out by Fischer (1952) it is not easy to determine the precise stage in the 
conversion of milk into butter or cheese when this work ceases to be primary and 
becomes secondary. The products produced by natural resource-based industries, as 
defined in this work, are most often processed even though it may not be to the same 
degree as secondary products. Besides, demand for natural resources has risen over                                                         
7 Hirschman does acknowledge that “the introduction of modern methods does bring with considerable 
outside purchases of seeds, fertilizers and, and other current inputs, not to speak of machines and vehicles. 
We may say that the more primitive the agricultural and mining activities, the more truly primary they are” 
(Hirschman 1958: p. 109-110). This does not change his main point, though.    
8 There are, at least, two arguments for why linkages can be weak, few or absent in primary production. (a) 
One argument is that the frequently seen foreign ownership of natural resource-based industry in less 
developed countries hinders linkages. (b) Another argument is that there is something special about natural 
resource-based industry – that the primary sector industries tend to have fewer linkages to other parts of 
the economy than secondary-sector industries. We will focus on (b).  
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the past decades to volumes that were earlier unimaginable in the form of food, raw 
materials and energy due to growth in global GDP and population. 
 
Despite the obvious objections listed above, the understanding of primary production 
as exposed by Hirschman (1958) (mainly based on subsistence agriculture or enclave 
industries) is currently part of the resource curse thesis as illustrated by inter alia 
Reinert (2007), Gylfason (2004) and Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (2007). 
Combined these studies have contributed to transforming context-specific experiences 
into a general conceptual model for understanding natural resources  which 
reciprocally supports the tripartite model of structural change.  
3.4 The nature of natural resources - finiteness and exogeneity  
As mentioned the idea of finiteness of natural resources is the foundation for arguing 
that natural resource-based industry is subject to diminishing returns to scale. We 
want to challenge this position by arguing that the knowledge stock in a given country 
determines to which extent it is capable of identifying and utilizing natural resources. 
For example oil and minerals have been in the earth’s crest as long as Homo sapiens 
have inhabited the planet, but it was only very recently that we identified oil as a 
valuable source of energy. The latter indicates that energy sources or natural resources 
to some extent are social constructs.    
 
Zimmermann (1972) points out that a resource is defined by its function. Coal is a 
resource in as much as it serves the function of generating energy for various 
operations. Without this function coal would still be coal, but it would not be a 
resource. These remarks open the floor for a conflict between the viewpoints of 
natural science and social science; “if nature is thought of as the universe, it may be 
considered constant…Nature in that sense is the topic of natural science. The social 
scientist is concerned, not with the totality of the physical universe, but with the 
meaning of nature for man, with that ever-changing portion of nature that is known to 
man and affects his existence. That portion is both expanding and contracting. It 
expands in response to increase in knowledge and improvement of the arts. Nature 
reveals herself gradually to man, but no faster than he can learn” (Zimmerman, 1972, 
80)9. It is therefore straightforward to denote the natural scientist’s view of nature as 
nature, and denote the social scientist’s view as natural resources, see table 1. In the 
interface between nature and natural resources there are ongoing processes of 
resource creation, resource obsolescing and resource extension10
 
.  
Natural science (nature) Social  science (natural resources) 
Constants of natural science ‘relatives’ of social science 
The world a bundle of hay – zero sum game  Non zero sum game 
Natural resources are Natural resources become 
Abstract or physical perception of natural 
resources. Nature exists only because it exists, 
Functional perception. A natural resource is a 
mean to an end, an end defined by man and                                                         
9 We are aware that natural science and social science do not necessarily use such simple and stereotypic 
perceptions of nature, but we ignore this diversity here for the sake of illustrating a relevant point – namely 
that there are different perceptions (both within and across disciplines), and that they matter greatly.  
10 Still, the issue of finiteness must be considered in relation to the aspect of time. In the (very) long run 
availability of energy and matter to humans is finite, which ought to affect technical change in the direction 
of energy and material-saving production, and a higher use of renewable sources (Georgescu-Roegen, 
1975). This is an important perspective, but for understanding processes of economic development, we 
must focus on shorter time horizons.   
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there is no function behind the existence of our 
planet and its characteristics.  
society, which makes it functional.   
Static perception of natural resources  Dynamic perception of natural resources 
Land supply is given and fixed Land: its function, yield and supply must be 
interpreted in relation to time, space and 
knowledge.   
Nature = natural resources  Nature is converted to natural resources in a 
process of learning and knowledge accumulation  
Table 2: Nature and natural resources. 
Rubber from the Amazon had been known to westerners for centuries but it was not 
until Charles Goodyear discovered ‘vulcanization’ in 1839, that rubber became a 
resource (creation). It became a resource because his discovery made it possible to 
satisfy human wants with the use of rubber. Eventually rubber production from the 
Amazon region was overtaken by producers in South-East Asia (obsolescing), and 
both were later overtaken by production of synthetic rubber (extension), which was 
developed during World War 2 (Zimmermann, 1972). Obviously, these processes are 
characterized by learning and accumulation of knowledge. Rosenberg (1976) argues 
that successful processes of resource creation and extension have been the foundation 
of countries’ capability to follow the shifts in dominant energy sources and materials 
that have characterized economic development the later centuries. ‘Knowledge 
explosions’ have historically undermined the tendency to diminishing returns to scale 
in natural resource-based industries.  
 
The idea that natural resource-based production has few or no linkages – seeing them 
as exogenous to the economic system - contributes to a negative perception of natural 
resource-based industry for two reasons. (1) Linkages are about spread effects – how 
one impulse (demand and/or innovation) to the economic system can create further 
impulses. Without linkages, a sector can never generate structural change and 
development – it may finance it through exports, but it can not ‘create’ it. (2) Absence 
of linkages implies that learning and innovation is absent with respect to inputs (freely 
available) and outputs (no further processing). It implies that growth of natural 
resource-based industries will not lead to diversification; but instead to poverty. As 
argued above natural resources have, in principle, linkages of all kinds. Natural 
resources must be produced, and are not freely available in nature. It requires 
development of technology and knowledge to build ships to go fishing, to extract 
minerals, to exploit wind energy and to improve agricultural yields. This argument 
strongly relates to the points of extending and creating natural resources, and 
illustrates the necessity of understanding natural resources as dynamic.  
 
In the following we will illustrate the above points by examples of natural resource-
based development from Norway, Brazil and the US. 
 
3.4.1 Natural resources in Norway 
Norway has historically been specialized in natural resource-based industries. In the 
19th century Norway responded to demands from the leading economy of the time, 
England, by increasing export of salted/dried fish and timber. The increasing transport 
of natural resources from Norway to England stimulated the development of shipping 
and shipbuilding industries as a backward linkage – by the 1880s Norway had against 
all likelihood the world’s third largest shipping fleet. As a response to the growing 
natural resource-based industries several linkages to what we can call manufacturing 
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appeared. Shipbuilding technology improved significantly, and production of 
intermediate products related to ship transport took off. Also, saw mills improved 
their equipment and implemented stream-driven saws in the 1870s. Norway actually 
started to export pulp and paper machinery in the 1890s. With respect to the fishing 
industry, whaling and canning took hold. In the 20th century new natural resource-
based industries appeared. These were based on access to cheap energy. Due to 
development of capabilities in chemical and electronic engineering Norway had 
succeeded in exploiting its waterfalls for production of hydroelectricity, which 
attracted foreign investments in energy-intensive products as zinc, artificial fertilizers 
and aluminium (Cappelen and Mjøset 2009).  
 
During the developments in the 19th century foreign capital played an important role, 
and foreigners had a strong presence in many areas. After independence from Sweden 
in 1905 Norway nationalized many parts of economy that were dominated by 
foreigners. Politicians implemented ‘concession laws’ that gave Norwegian 
authorities control over the relevant water resources. Still, the law changes allowed 
for joint ventures between national and foreign enterprises, which according to 
Cappelen and Mjøset (2009) was aimed at developing a Norwegian knowledge base 
for the relevant engineering supply industries. Subsequently, manufacturing of 
turbines and machinery for power production became significant backward linkages 
from hydropower. Also, after World War 2 production of components for automobile 
production developed as a forward linkage from the production of aluminium.  
 
After World War 2 another natural resource-based industry was added to Norway’s 
portfolio – oil and gas. At the time when Norway discovered oil and gas it did not 
posses the capabilities necessary to develop an oil industry, which stimulated a 
process of foreign capital inflow and suggested a dominant role of multinational 
enterprises. In the spirit of the earlier concession laws Norway created a national oil 
company, Statoil, in 1972 which was put in control of oil extraction and distribution. 
The state in Norway had from the start a strategy on knowledge acquisition from 
foreign firms, and actually one of Statoil’s main tasks was to organise learning and 
technology transfers. Also, universities started up activities as research and education 
in areas relevant for the oil industry. According to Cappelen and Mjøset (2009) policy 
was targeted at developing linkages between the oil industry and suppliers. For 
example Statoil would exercise public procurement by placing orders with several old 
and new Norwegian firms, which resulted in that old shipyards were restructured into 
producers of oil-related technology. Mainly due to the rough Norwegian waters a new 
design for oil platforms was developed. Norway developed several product 
innovations that would later be internationally competitive. Also specialized 
engineering, ICT and other business services have benefitted from the development of 
the oil industry in Norway. It is moreover remarkable to note that other countries as 
England, Denmark and the Netherlands also discovered oil and gas in the same period 
as Norway. While such discoveries were associated with harmful economic effects (to 
manufacturing) in the Netherlands, it actually strengthened manufacturing activities in 
Norway (Fagerberg, Mowery et al. 2009).     
 
The above reflects that the Norwegian state was actively building institutions and 
linkages to avoid a dependency and ‘enclave’ situation with the international division 
of labour in mind – and also that it is possible to do so. The institution building 
facilitated processes of capability building in several complementary areas related to 
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oil production. It is an example of how co-evolution between natural resource-based 
industry and manufacturing contributes to economic development, and where natural 
resource-based industry is actually ‘leading’ the process.  
 
3.4.2 Sugarcane in Brazil 
The Brazilian experience in growing sugarcane and commercially producing sugar-
based products as sugar, ethanol11, bio-electricity12, flex-fuel vehicles13
 
 and ‘green’ 
plastic (produced from ethanol), is an interesting story – one that brings another 
perspective on linkages in natural resource-based industry.    
Brazil has produced sugarcane for more than four centuries, but only seriously started 
producing ethanol as a response to the international oil crises in the 1970s (Moreira 
and Goldemberg, 1999). A large-scale public investment program was launched 
(Proalcool) which considerably increased production and capacity. Since the launch 
of Proalcool there has been substantial productivity improvements in both sugarcane 
and ethanol production14
 
. Sugarcane productivity has increased 2.3% p.a. between 
1975 and 2004 while ethanol productivity has increased 1.17% p.a. on average in the 
same period (Matines-Filho et al., 2006). Furthermore, in Sao Paulo the mills have,  
since the start of Proalcool, achieved a 33% increase in tons of sugar per ha; 8% more 
sugar extracted from cane; 14% efficiency improvement in conversion of cane sugar 
into ethanol and 130% productivity increase in the fermentation process (UNICA, 
2007). The Technological developments that lie behind these improvements can be 
divided into two periods. 1980-1990: introduction of new cane varieties; new grinding 
systems, fermentation with larger capacity; use of vinasse (by-product of sugar 
production) as fertilizer; biological control of sugarcane beetle; optimization of 
agricultural operations; autonomy in energy. 1990-2000: start of energy surplus sales; 
improved technical, agricultural and industrial management; new sugarcane 
harvesting and transportation systems; advanced industrial automation (UNICA, 
2007). Since the year 2000 several other innovations have been generated where the 
more important are the flex fuel vehicle and increased capacity in co-generation of 
electricity. 
The productivity improvements reflect learning and innovation activities in and 
around the natural resource-based industry. It is also clear that the cultivation of 
sugarcane has many backward and forward linkages to other parts of the Brazilian 
economy, cf. table 2 and table 3 in appendix. This implies that the activities going on 
within the sugarcane industry stimulate production, learning and innovation activities 
in related areas through linkage effects. The Brazilian example helps us to 
acknowledge that natural resources are clearly endogenous because there are 
important feedbacks and interactions via linkages, and there is significant dependence 
upon stocks of knowledge accumulated with respect to extension and creation of 
natural resources. 
                                                         
11 Most commonly-used renewable biofuel. 
12 Bagasse (residue from the sugarcane) is burnt to heat water whose steam drives turbines. Recently sugar 
and ethanol mills are selling surplus electricity to the national grid and thereby increasing the role of 
sugarcane-based energy in the Brazilian energy matrix.  
13 Cars that can run on any mixture of gasoline and ethanol. 
14 Our focus here is geographically on the part of the industry placed in the state of São Paulo, which is the 
most industrialized, most developed and richest state in Brazil. 
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3.4.3 Minerals and oil in the US  
According to Wright and Czelusta (1997; 2002; 2004) the US was 1913 the world 
leader in production of virtually every mineral. And this was not because of a 
proportional natural endowment of natural resources – instead it was a result of 
learning. Between 1900 and 1914 the US produced 10 times more copper than Chile 
even though Chile had, and has, a much larger geological endowment. The US 
mineral industries advanced in 1870s and 1880s due to huge capital investments, but 
the major breakthroughs took place in metallurgy and improved conversion processes 
as e.g. the Bessemer process which allowed for a far higher exploitation rate of the 
mineral. Moreover, according to Wright and Czelusta (2002) there is reason to believe 
that the US leadership in minerals was a significant factor in shaping, if not 
propelling, the US path to world leadership in manufacture. The US had significant 
‘materials-using bias’ in technical change in 9 of 20 USA manufacturing industries 
between 1850 and 1919: “Nearly all USA manufactured goods were closely linked to 
the natural-resource economy in ‘one way or another’: petroleum products, primary 
copper, meat packing and poultry, steel works and rolling mills, coal mining, 
vegetable oils, grain mill products, sawmill products, and so on. These observations 
by no means diminish the country’s industrial achievement, but they confirm that 
American industrialisation was built upon natural resources” (p. 5). Among key 
explanatory factors for the US’s experience in minerals are; (a) liberal and softly 
enforced legal environment; (b) investments in infrastructure and public knowledge as 
geological surveys; (c) education and research in mining, minerals, geology and 
metallurgy in which the US was world leader at the time.  
 
Oil is an extreme example of the mechanisms just described. The discovery of oil as a 
valuable natural resource was made in the US despite the country’s relatively poor 
natural endowment of oil. The first oil well was established in 1859. Gradually the US 
built up the “American way of life” based on cheap oil and automobiles. By 1913 the 
US production of oil amounted to a bit more than 60% of world production despite 
the majority of known oil resources were located in the Middle East (Mousdale 2008). 
Often American geologists were employed as consultants by oil firms to help locate 
deposits of oil in the ground. The industry quickly saw the value of scientific 
knowledge which created linkages between academia and industry. Young geologists 
used the national US geological survey to apply the novel anti-clinical theory which 
successfully was used to locate oil deposits. The use of new theory resulted in better 
search methods. In general the oil industry invested in the accumulation of knowledge 
in geology to serve its activities which is reflected by the establishment of the Berkley 
and Stanford Universities that are children of the oil boom in California. Also, there 
emerged an important linkage to the chemical industry. Actually, with the 
development of petrochemicals in the 1920s, one may say that oil was instrumental in 
the transition of manufacturing in USA from traditional mass production to science-
based technologies. Until the 1920s the base material in chemical industry had mostly 
been coal, but this changed radically in the following years. The shift from coal to oil 
as raw material brought the US to the world frontier in chemical industries. A drive 
for diversification created important forward linkages wherein new industries were 
created on the basis of new knowledge.  
 
The above indicates that (i) it was not abundance of natural resources per se (in terms 
of deposits) that was the reason for American leadership, but learning and capability 
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building; (ii) that the development of manufacturing industry was directly related to 
the development of natural resource-based industries.  
3.5 Different Approaches 
The different perspectives on natural resources described (exogeneity and finiteness) 
are consequences of different analytical foci. If one perceives natural resources as 
exogenous and finite, then an obvious analytical focus would be to search for the most 
efficient use possible of these scarce resources. On the other hand, if one perceives 
natural resources as endogenous and non-finite such that scarcity changes with 
knowledge accumulation, then the analytical focus would also include a search for 
understanding the processes of resource creation. If one wants to understand long-
term development then it seems that to study allocation of current resources is less 
important than a dynamic perspective in which resources are both created and 
utilized. The difference between the approaches can be conceptualized as an 
‘endowment approach’ (static) and a ‘process approach’ (dynamic) to economic 
development.  
 
In the endowment approach one focuses on the given stocks of resources at ones 
disposal. These are subject to prices that are mainly set by conditions of scarcity. 
Considering current and estimated future consumption together with current and 
estimated decrease in global supply, it is possible to establish a scenario wherefrom 
one can deduct at what time we will run out of a specific resource, and how price 
movements will be until then. Based on this information, it is possible to calculate an 
‘optimal’ extraction and sales rate of energy resources, which maximizes income 
from deposits (see e.g. Hotelling 1931). This view implies that given endowments and 
demand, the price of energy will rise continuously as will the share of GDP going to 
energy consumption. Based on such a view W.S. Jevons (1866) argued in his 
publication ‘The Coal Question’ that: “I draw the conclusion that I think any one 
would draw, that we cannot long maintain our present rate of increase of 
consumption; that we can never advance to the higher amounts of consumption 
supposed. But this only means that the check to our progress must become perceptible 
considerably within a century from the present time; that the cost of fuel must rise, 
perhaps within a lifetime, to a rate threatening our commercial and manufacturing 
supremacy; and the conclusion is inevitable, that our present happy progressive 
condition is a thing of limited duration”. The situation would look different in a 
process approach where it is recognised that (a) deposits of energy often increases 
significant via improved search, (b) sources of energy has often changed (in modern 
economies), (c) it is important to search for substitute sources, (d) the ability to 
change energy sources is partly determined by prior innovation and capabilities, (e) 
energy is a source of competitiveness wherefore productivity in extraction and 
conversion is important, and (f) experiences and incomes from the process of energy 
resource utilisation may be used to build new competences in activities, which are not 
immediately related to these resources (Rosenberg 1976). A process view thus implies 
an active rather than passive approach to the economic exploitation of energy deposits 
even when there are vast reserves. The different perspectives and derived analytical 
consequences are summarized in table 2. 
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Parameter Endowment approach  Process approach 
Nature vs. 
natural 
resources  
- Static, finite, zero-sum game 
- Physical perception like natural 
science 
- Land is fixed  
- Nature = natural resources  
- Dynamic, alterable, non-finite, positive-
sum 
- Functional perception in social science 
- Land-function can be extended via 
learning 
- Nature is converted to natural resources 
in processes of learning  
Finiteness  Natural resources are finite and thus 
subject to ‘decreasing returns to 
scale’.  
Not necessarily finite. Important natural 
resources changes over time according to 
knowledge accumulation.   
Linkages  
 
Natural resources are freely available 
in nature - linkages  
Not freely, they are produced. Creates 
linkages across the tripartite classification  
Learning  
 
Because of decreasing returns to scale 
and absence of linkages learning 
potential is limited. 
Significant learning potential   
Exogenous, 
endogenous? 
Natural resources should be seen as an 
exogenous, independent stock of raw 
material  
 
Natural resources are clearly endogenous 
because of their dependence upon stock of 
knowledge  
Natural 
resources and 
development   
Contradiction – natural resources are 
cursed, and will therefore block 
structural change. 
Co-evolution – natural resources can serve 
as a base for diversification of the 
economy (structural change) via learning 
processes and linkage building 
Policy 
consequences 
Get out of natural resource-based 
industry, and into manufacture and 
services 
Explore the role of natural resources in 
specific contexts. Focus on linkages and 
learning  
Table 3: Endowment versus process approach to natural resources. 
 
Obviously a process approach takes on a dynamic perception of natural resources, and 
is thus incompatible with both the resource curse and the tripartite understanding of 
structural change. It has been strongly indicated that manufacturing and services are 
not necessarily always ‘better’ for development than natural resource-based industry. 
One flaw of the resource-curse argument is that it rests on an endowment rather than a 
process approach to economics. The latter seems better suited for understanding 
processes of change regarding natural resources. In the next section we will present an 
alternative conceptual model of structural change that is capable of incorporating a 
process approach to natural resources and structural change. 
 
4 A Process Approach to Structural Change  
The patterns of structural change need to be carefully interpreted. The structural 
changes observed may be undeniable, but the causalities involved and the underlying 
processes are not convincingly explained in the tripartite conceptual model.  
 
Kuznets noted that in 1948 over a third of the value of production of total 
manufacturing was accounted for by economic activities that did not exist in 1880, or 
had such a limited size that they in total only produced 3.2% of total manufacturing 
output (Kuznets, 1971, 319). Furthermore, it is clear that the automobile industry 
together with some related industries15                                                        
15 As for example petrochemicals, oil, plastic and rubber in the US. 
 are very important growth industries in this 
period. Even though the growth rate of this subsector of manufacturing was higher in 
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the period 1880-1914 than in 1914-1948, its increase in the share of the value of 
output grows more in the second period. Kuznets interprets this observation as a non-
linear trend in the development of industries. An industry will make its growth 
potential count, not in the early turbulent phases of its growth, but only when it has a 
sufficiently large volume for its above average growth to make a substantial 
contribution to the aggregate income. Obviously one must pay attention to both 
volume- and price movements in order to understand an industry’s contribution to 
national GDP. The latter implies that that economic growth does not emanate from a 
specific economic structure, but rather from shifts in it. Thus, which industries that 
can be identified as being ‘good’ for aggregate growth changes over time. Kuznets 
further argued that these changes in the economic structure were both outcomes and 
drivers of innovation. These findings indicate that it may be more interesting to focus 
on shifts in economic structure, than to claim that there exists a best structure for 
development. 
 
In accordance with these considerations Lundvall (1985, 1992) proposes that viewing 
the economic structure in terms of vertical connections instead of horizontal ones can 
improve our understanding of the underlying mechanisms of structural change and the 
interactions between industries16
 
 - i.e. by taking a process approach. His starting point 
is that learning is predominantly interactive and that innovation must be understood as 
a process. In line with Kuznets, Lundvall argues that innovation is the main driver of 
structural change and development. In a vertical structure every part interacts with its 
input producers and/or users of output. Innovation often emerges in the interaction 
between different actors that are part of the vertical chain – a user-producer approach. 
This approach implies that innovations are strongly related to the prevailing economic 
structures and to the institutions, which affect patterns of interactions that generate 
changes in the structure. The focus is here on innovation in capital goods industry, not 
final consumer goods (even though the same approach can be applied there too).  
The starting point for Lundvall's analysis is that users and producers are formally 
independent entities separated by a market, but durably related through linkages 
wherein transactions and communication, including more things than just prices and 
quantities, take place. Innovation is seen as a cumulative process and as emerging 
from a confrontation of user needs with technological opportunities. Users naturally 
know more about their own needs than producers, and producers know more about 
technological opportunities than users. Thus, in order to produce the best product for 
the user, the producer needs detailed information about needs in production. Also, the 
more information users have about technological opportunities, the better they are at 
formulating their needs. This situation entails interdependence between users and 
producers in a vertical – and the performance of the vertical as a whole depends on 
each component within it, as well as the institutional framework it is situated in, 
which makes performance systemic.  
                                                         
16 A horizontal view refers inter alia to the categorization of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. A 
vertical approach perceives the economic system as consisting of verticals (chains) of production that often 
crosses the tripartite categorization mentioned above. Economic systems in the ‘industrial age’ are most 
often characterized by vertical structures, whereas in pre-industrial societies primary, secondary and tertiary 
production were not separated, but all exercised by the same unit of production – a farm growing corn 
(primary), processing it into bread (secondary) and bringing it to the market for selling (tertiary). During 
successive ‘industrial revolutions’ the latter pattern of production was broken by an increasing division of 
labour and specialization.  
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The information needed in interactive innovation can not be communicated via price 
signals in a market – it also requires different kinds of qualitative, sometimes 
personal, interaction extended over time. It thus makes sense to distinguish between 
linkages, which only channel arms-length monetary transactions and durable linkages, 
which also channel qualitative information. Terms like the quantity of linkages and 
the quality of linkages may become useful.  
 
The argument here is that primary production, manufacturing industry and services 
are interrelated and interdependent parts of an economic system (seen as consisting of 
verticals embedded in a larger structure), where changes in one part can stimulate 
changes in the other parts - they co-evolve. The latter was illustrated by the examples 
in the previous section. Hence, not only is it difficult to say that one part of the 
vertical is more important than another, but actually innovation often emerges from 
the interactions between these parts, which calls for a policy approach that focuses, 
not on ‘good activities’, but on the systemic performance of national verticals. This 
understanding merges with the insight of Kuznets since innovation leads to changes in 
production structure, and supports growth and development. Actually, Kuznets 
himself argued that the growth and development of several now-developed countries 
has been based primarily on the commercialisation and technological modernisation 
of agriculture rather than on industry per se. According to him it is a mistake to 
universally identify ‘modern growth’ with industrialisation and capitalism (Easterlin 
2008). 
 
Recently, Hidalgo et al (2007) have argued that the level of sophistication of the 
present product mix in an economy affects the speed of structural adjustment towards 
higher productivity activities and hence the speed of development. The sophistication 
of the product mix is characterized by how the products are related to each other. 
They may for example depend on similar infrastructures and institutions, they may 
use similar technologies and competences and they may deliver inputs to each other. 
In a more abstract version of a user-producer approach, networks of related products 
and activities may be seen as drivers of development due to the systemic nature of 
economic performance. 
 
The historic process of structural change can be understood as an increasing division 
of labour (inter alia) driven by innovation (and vice versa), which results in verticals 
of production consisting of interdependent parts. Innovation, which drives shifts in 
economic structure and development, emanates from the prevailing economic 
structure, which consists of the verticals crossing the whole tripartite classification. 
Since it is generally not possible to identify one part in a changing structure as 
generally and permanently more important than others, they are all involved in 
generating development.  
 
From the perspective of interactive learning it is relevant to reconsider Hirschman’s 
observation that manufacturing has more linkage potential than primary production. 
Compared to other sectors manufacturing has historically been very well connected 
and thus a basic source of innovation. When interactive learning between firms is an 
important element in innovation processes the structure of linkages becomes 
important too. But it is the quality of interactions, formed by an enabling institutional 
framework, that matters the most, not the quantity of transactions. Consequently, what 
constitutes a ‘developmental’ or ‘sophisticated’ production structure changes over 
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time. Structure fundamentalism contains, like the other fundamentalisms we have 
identified, valuable insights, but it is too static and must be complemented with 
attention to the quality of linkages, innovation and structural change in order to be of 
much help for understanding development.  
5 Endowments and Processes 
The alleged ‘deeper causes’ of development, which characterize the 
‘fundamentalisms’ (markets, institutions, knowledge and economic structure) have, as 
was also the case of natural resources, both static and dynamic elements (or can be 
given both static and dynamic interpretations). The development factors can be 
understood in both an endowment approach and in a processes approach, cf. table. 
 
Development factor Endowment approach  Process approach  
Markets Transaction costs and macroeconomic 
balance determine development. 
Stabilize, privatize and liberalize and 
let markets do their job to increase 
growth. 
Institutions The main characteristics of the 
institutional framework determine 
development, negatively and 
positively.  
Institutional learning (i.e. adaptation 
and change of the institutional 
framework) determines development. 
Knowledge Stocks of knowledge (know how, 
know why, know what) drive 
development. 
Accumulation and change of 
knowledge by learning (and 
forgetting) and innovation determines 
growth and development. 
Economic structure There is a close connection between 
economic structure and development. 
Development can be supported  by  
getting the economic structure ‘right’, 
i.e. by increasing the share of ‘good’ 
(manufacturing and services) 
industries and activities and 
decreasing the share of ‘bad’ 
(primary) sectors. 
Industries identified as good change 
over time. Development is driven by 
changes in economic structure 
resulting from learning and 
innovation rather than by a certain 
type of structure. 
Table 4: Root factors of development: Endowments and processes. 
 
The endowment view fits into a neoclassical theoretical framework in which 
endowments, and change of endowments, are exogenously given, trade is explained 
by comparative advantages and the pivotal point is an optimal equilibrium. The 
process view, in contrast, leans towards evolutionary and institutional economics with 
endogenous resource endowments, trade explained by dynamic comparative 
advantages and where focus is on a process of change with interaction and cumulative 
causation between the various factors of development. 
 
Fundamentalism in development thinking may not always be harmful. As the much 
used notions ‘knowledge based development’ and ‘resource based development’ 
indicate (development is based on but not exclusively depending on knowledge or 
resources) there also exists milder and less objectionable forms of fundamentalism, 
which only claim that from a development policy point of view it may be a good idea 
to concentrate on a leading factor like investment in human capital or utilization of 
abundant and accessible natural resources. Furthermore, each of the fundamentalisms 
may be given a more dynamic interpretation or at least connected to more dynamic 
arguments.  
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The problem with fundamentalism in development thinking is not the ambition to find 
the most important development factor but rather that the approach is often more in 
accordance with an endowment view than a process view. Furthermore, there is a 
tendency to overlook the other development factors and, especially, to neglect the 
interdependencies between the different factors. For example, that technological and 
institutional change interacts (sometimes harmoniously, sometimes contradictorily) 
with each other in the development process is so overwhelmingly documented in 
historic research that any attempt to depict one of them as the deep cause of 
development at the expense of the other should be met with suspicion.  
 
Generally, the development factors feed upon each other and set the stage for each 
other. Each of them is insufficient and appears ‘fundamentalistic’ when it stands 
alone, but when they are combined with each other in a process oriented model of 
development, which focuses on their interactions, the importance of each of them is, 
in fact, enhanced.  
 
Inter alia the story of sugarcane in Brazil illustrates the latter point very well. Here the 
interactions between several factors such as natural resources, institutions, 
knowledge, market form, entrepreneurship and ‘good’ policy have over time 
generated beneficial shifts in the production structure surrounding the sugarcane 
production benefitting the Brazilian economy as a whole. It is not possible to explain 
this process in terms of monocausalism. The process should rather be understood as 
evolution of an economic system via interaction between different activities (crossing 
the tripartite classification) and development factors, which has increased the 
complexity and level of development of the Brazilian economy. 
 
A counter pole to monocausalism is another form of fundamentalism, which should 
also be avoided – we can call it ‘fundamental relativism’. It refers to an approach 
where all development factors are considered of equal importance, regardless of time 
and space17
6 Conclusion   
. We want to propose an approach which stands somewhere in between 
monocausalism and fundamental relativism. All factors of development are not 
always equally important. In specific cases it is normally possible to identify ‘leading’ 
development factors in specific processes. In for example the Brazilian case it is clear 
that the productivity growth of sugarcane cultivation (stemming from learning) is 
crucial for the performance of the industrial complex surrounding it. Therefore it is 
possible to say that this is an example of natural resource-based development, even 
though the development process would certainly not have taken place without the 
presence of other supporting development factors. Therefore an analysis must take all 
relevant factors as well as their relative weight and their interactions over time into 
account in the quest for understanding processes and causalities in economic 
development if a useful development policy is to be formulated.   
Even though our discussion does not warrant anything near a full treatment of 
different approaches in development theory, our critique of ‘fundamentalisms’ 
cautiously points in a specific direction. As illustrated by our empirical examples, it is 
not the various endowments per se that are ‘fundamental’ for development, but rather                                                         
17 An example is a growth theory where there is perfect and marginal substitutability among development 
factors – a constellation which in principle allows for development with any natural resource.  
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the by institutions sustained interdependency and interaction between the different 
types of development factors, and how these are managed or coordinated. Processes 
of cumulative causation between changes in development factors bring about 
contradictions and problems, which feed learning and innovation. Innovation is in the 
long run connected to structural change as new processes and products enter the 
economy. This implies that development is always and inevitably connected to 
structural change. It involves evolution of networks and other and patterns of 
interaction between different production activities, which feed structural change 
towards activities with higher productivity.  
 
We suggest that in order to be well-equipped for grasping the nature of structural 
change and development, researchers must adhere to a process approach and reject the 
endowment approach and monocausalism. At the same time researchers should avoid 
‘fundamental relativism’18
 
. Instead we propose an approach which falls somewhere 
between monocausalism and fundamental relativism. All factors of development are 
not always equally important. In specific cases it is normally possible to identify 
‘leading’ development factors in specific processes. In our example from the 
Brazilian sugarcane industrial complex, cane cultivation is a leading factor – natural 
resources are a leading factor. Therefore it is justified to talk of natural resource-based 
development. 
Still, there are no guarantees, and the crucial question in development policy therefore 
becomes whether you can make the development factors feed upon and support each 
other. It is obviously not enough to have access to abundant natural resources. That 
can be a curse as well as a blessing. But if you can build an institutional framework 
for the utilization of specific natural resources, which supports development of new 
knowledge and competences that can be applied in a range of different activities, 
resource based development may be possible. This possibility is also suggested by our 
Brazilian example where cane is the base for several competitive positions as e.g. 
sugar, biofuels, alcohol chemistry and ‘green’ plastics, sucrose chemistry and new 
materials, energy co-generation, and cellulosic fuel. 
 
The above is in line with a later contribution from Hirschman (1981) where he 
acknowledged that the lack of linkages in natural resource-based industry as 
compared to manufacture was not a consequence of natural resource-based industry 
per se, but rather because the actors involved in these activities often were not capable 
of establishing new activities related to e.g. agriculture, and thus creating linkages, 
that were significantly distant from the ongoing activities in terms of knowledge bases 
and technology – what he calls technological alienation. The only reasonable solution 
is again to be found in an institutional arrangement that aims at overcoming such 
knowledge barriers.  
 
The importance of institutions and structures as well as their changes in this 
understanding of development points in the direction of a broad system of 
innovation19                                                        
18 With which we mean an approach where all development factors are considered of equal importance, 
regardless of time and space 
 approach to development theory and policy. The main reason for this is 
that a systemic approach necessarily focuses not only on factor endowments but 
19 Defined in the ‘classical’ way as ‘all parts and aspects of the economic structure and the institutional set-
up affecting learning as well as searching and exploring’ (Lundvall 1992) 
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rather on how the people controlling the endowments interact with each other and 
with other sectors of the economy. One of the fundamental insights from the 
innovation system literature is that economic performance is systemic. The latter 
implies that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, and that the interrelationships 
and interactions between elements are as important for processes and outcomes as are 
the elements themselves (Lundvall 2007). The innovation system approach thus 
embraces a process view on development, but it also acknowledges that such 
processes are not automatic and need to be coordinated. It provides an analytical 
framework for understanding evolution of complex economic systems and hence 
learning how to identify, diagnose and proscribe medicine for economic development. 
The ability to catch the interdependencies, interactions and the respective 
endowments all together in the analysis is the crucial point here – a point, which is not 
compatible with an endowment approach to economics or monocausal explanations. 
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8 Appendix  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Natural-resource based industries. 
 
 
 
 
Sachs and Warner (1997) define primary products or natural resource industries as ‘fuels’ and ‘non-fuel 
primary products’ from the World Data 1995 (World Bank). Non-fuel primary products corresponds to SITC 
categories 0, 1, 2, 4 and 68, and fuels corresponds to SITC category 3: 
• 0 - Food and live animals  
o 00 - Live animals other than animals of division 03 
o 01 - Meat and meat preparations 
o 02 - Dairy products and birds' eggs 
o 03 - Fish (not marine mammals), crustaceans, molluscs and aquatic invertebrates, and 
preparations thereof 
o 04 - Cereals and cereal preparations 
o 05 - Vegetables and fruit 
o 06 - Sugars, sugar preparations and honey 
o 07 - Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof 
o 08 - Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals) 
o 09 - Miscellaneous edible products and preparations 
• 1 - Beverages and tobacco  
o 11 - Beverages 
o 12 - Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 
• 2 - Crude materials, inedible, except fuels  
o 21 - Hides, skins and furskins, raw 
o 22 - Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits 
o 23 - Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed) 
o 24 - Cork and wood 
o 25 - Pulp and waste paper 
o 26 - Textile fibres (other than wool tops and other combed wool) and their wastes (not 
manufactured into yarn or fabric) 
o 27 - Crude fertilizers, other than those of division 56, and crude minerals (excluding coal, 
petroleum and precious stones) 
o 28 - Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 
o 29 - Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s. 
• 3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials  
o 32 - Coal, coke and briquettes 
o 33 - Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials 
o 34 - Gas, natural and manufactured 
o 35 - Electric current 
• 4 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes  
o 41 - Animal oils and fats 
o 42 - Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude, refined or fractionated 
o 43 - Animal or vegetable fats and oils, processed; waxes of animal or vegetable origin; 
inedible mixtures or preparations of animal or vegetable fats or oils, n.e.s. 
• 6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
o 68 – Non-ferrous metals  
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Table 7: Linkages in sugarcane ethanol industrial complex in Brazil (Dahl Andersen, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Backward Linkages 
1. R&D on crop varieties 
 
2. Machinery & Equipment 
- Mechanization of sowing, growing, 
harvest. 
- Mills and equipment 
- Transport  
- Process automation 
 
3. Special Services 
- Highly developed agronomy 
competence 
- Specialized technology consultancy  
 
4. Research in plant genetics, 
chemistry, transport systems, 
agronomy, tropical agriculture, new 
materials, biotechnology, and engine 
technology.  
 
5. Distribution Infrastructure 
 
6. Marketing, economics and 
Logistics related to both domestic 
and, especially, international markets.  
 
7. Regulation 
- Meteorology and related disciplines 
of chemistry, physics.   
- Sustainability 
 
 
 
 
Forward Linkages 
 
1. Sugar 
- Several different types 
 
2. Ethanol  
- Hydrous and anhydrous 
 
3. Plastic 
- Ethanol-based plastics and starch-
based plastics 
 
4. Other co-products 
 - Cattle fodder, organic fertilizers. 
 
5. Bio-diesel 
- Ethanol can be further processed into 
diesel. Technology not yet commercially 
applied at larger scale. 
 
6. Bio-electricity 
 
7. Distribution Infrastructure 
 
 
Natural 
resource-
based 
industry: 
Sugarcane 
cultivation 
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Table 8: Knowledge bases in sugarcane ethanol industrial complex in Brazil (Dahl Andersen, 
2009). 
 
 
Activity Technique Knowledge base  
Agriculture – 
developing, planting, 
growing, harvesting and 
transporting sugarcane  
Analyzing soil qualities and 
local climatic conditions. 
Use of satellite monitor.   
Match soil information with a 
suitable genetic variety. 
Modern machinery. 
Agronomy (plant genetics, plant 
physiology, meteorology, and soil 
science); Precision agriculture (requires 
the use of new technologies, such as 
global positioning (GPS), sensors, 
satellites or aerial images, and 
information management tools to assess 
and understand variations); 
Biotechnology; Genetics 
Industrial processing – 
producing sugar, 
ethanol and co-products 
Mill construction. 
Cleaning, sorting and crushing 
sugarcane. 
Processing.  
Automation systems.  
Electro engineering; Mechanical 
engineering; Physics; Chemistry; Micro 
electronics; Micro biology; Bio-
chemistry; Thermo chemistry; 
Hydraulics; Automation 
Further processing of 
co-products - plastics 
Producing plastic Chemistry, Petro-chemistry, Bio-
chemistry, Plant genetics, Bio-materials  
Distribution and 
Transport 
Quality control 
Storing 
Infrastructure  
 
Meteorology (atmospheric chemistry); 
Logistics; Informatics; Material 
technology; Systems engineering   
 
Marketing phase  International market 
penetration. 
Sustainability responsibility and 
green products – certifications. 
IT control systems and 
international standards. 
Patenting competences 
Logistics; Informatics; Economics 
